Presented at the International Workshop on Radiological Sciences and Applications (IWRSA), Albuquerque, NM June 16-18, 2003

ABSTRACT

Speculation over a possible terrorist nuclear threat first surfaced in November 2001, when the Times of London reported that Western intelligence officials believed al Qaeda had acquired nuclear materials. Since then, the possibility of terrorists smuggling nuclear materials into the U.S. has resulted in widespread efforts to close security gaps at seaports, border crossings, and nuclear material storage sites worldwide. With support from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Canberra is implementing integrated radiation monitoring and detection security systems at airports and nuclear repositories outside the U.S. All system elements are networked together for a central review either on-site or at one or more remote locations. This integrated approach allows for the inclusion of radiation detectors, portal monitors, x-ray and explosive detection systems, electronic seals, and surveillance systems in addition to more commonly used physical protection devices. This paper discusses how networking such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) detection equipment can provide a streamlined, yet flexible, monitoring and detection system for WMD. 

INTRODUCTION

Speculation over a possible terrorist nuclear threat has mounted since November 2001, when the Times of London reported that Western intelligence officials believed al Qaeda had acquired nuclear materials. Since then, concern has escalated regarding the potential for terrorists to smuggle nuclear materials into the United States, resulting in widespread efforts to close security gaps at seaports, border crossings, and nuclear material storage sites worldwide. 

In response, the U.S. government and commercial entities are ramping up efforts to employ a variety of radiation detection devices at multiple checkpoints. For example, since 1998, Customs has provided more than 4,000 radiation pagers to its border inspectors and plans to deliver another 4,000 by September 2003.¹ According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), "Customs plans to install portal monitors at every U.S. border crossing and port of entry."² As of October 2002, Customs had deployed over 200 radiation detectors on its X-ray systems for screening small packages 

While the deployment of detectors is considered prescriptive for countering the nuclear threat, the widespread application of such technologies could create an operational/response management crisis particularly if the alarm data from these detectors is not centralized. For example, the GAO states that "[a]ccording to U.S. radiation detection vendors and DOE laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively used in conjunction with other radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors..."³ Having multiple radiation detection devices perform interdiction functions at multiple locations creates a number of challenges, including the integration of systems and data, management of the information, as well as the coordination of response teams to simultaneous alarms at multiple checkpoints. 

In the following, we will discuss how networking detection equipment can provide a streamlined, yet flexible, solution to the evolving technology management challenges presented by the potential proliferation of radiological Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD). As a case study, the authors point to a networking method that is presently being deployed with support from the U.S. Department of Energy to link data from various security system components such as portal monitors and surveillance cameras and securely transmit that data for centralized analysis and response coordination.