Presented at the ESARDA Annual Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, London, UK, May 10-12, 2005

ABSTRACT

The threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism has inspired a multitude of initiatives to develop and improve technological and institutional capabilities to prevent the proliferation and illicit trafficking of nuclear or radiological devices, materials, and technologies. Due to the nature of misuse and diversion scenarios, terrorism threats are similar to some of the challenges encountered by the international non-proliferation community. Therefore, authorities with counter-terrorism responsibilities often turn towards the Safeguards community to take advantage of methods and instrumentation that have proven effective for verification of non-proliferation commitments. Such methods include material control and accountability, as well as - in the context of the implementation of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC /540 corrected) - the detection of undeclared materials and activities. The following paper will identify instrumentation suitable for application in counter-terrorism scenarios, such as Safeguards specific non-destructive assay (NDA) and containment and surveillance (C/S) equipment. Next, the paper will outline challenges to adapt such Safeguards instrumentation for security enhancing applications. In this process of adaptation, the paper will then highlight the advantages of networking different equipment categories to provide more comprehensive barriers and protection against diversion and misuse of materials. A list of preliminary recommendations for implementation of such comprehensive approaches concludes the paper. 

INTRODUCTION

The threat of terrorist actions employing nuclear or radiological devices has caused numerous changes to existing public security policy as well as the formulation of new initiatives intended to strengthen borders and infrastructure against the trafficking of nuclear or radiological devices, materials, and technologies. In addition to policy changes, new technologies and methods of operation have been developed to respond to terrorist threats. 

Despite the deeply rooted differences in purpose and application, some aspects of Security activities are similar in their goals to Safeguards activities when it comes to the usage of technical instrumentation. Authorities in both arenas seek to prevent the spread of restricted materials and to detect diversion in a timely manner. The fact that counter-terrorism calls for immediate responses while Safeguards goals are subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) timeliness strategy matters little for the detection technologies used. Similarities extend to specific conditions and responsibilities within both communities, including the need to monitor material trafficking areas and to secure restricted materials in a variety of forms. In addition, comprehensive monitoring systems in use in both counter-terrorism and Safeguards activities must integrate a variety of instrumentation: In counter-terrorism systems this may include biometrics, surveillance cameras, and radiation, metal and explosives detectors, while Safeguards systems may include cameras, radiation detectors, and electronic container seals.

As a result of these similarities, solutions developed specifically for use within the Safeguards community can under certain circumstances be adapted to meet the needs of Security authorities. These include specific technologies and systems developed within the private sector as well as general approaches implemented at the government level. On the other hand, there also exist fundamental differences between both areas that reflect on the potential of Safeguards instrumentation to meet counter-terrorism goals and vice versa. 

This paper will identify interface points between Safeguards and Security efforts (with a focus on counter-terrorism) and will summarize programs and technologies currently in use in the Safeguards arena appropriate for use in counter-terrorism scenarios, including non-destructive assay (NDA) equipment and customized monitoring and surveillance systems. Some solutions need to be adapted for application in the counter-terrorism field. The advantages and challenges of adapting these programs and technologies will also be illustrated. An overview of expanding cross-over solutions between Safeguards and Security applications concludes the paper.