Presented at the 27th Annual ESARDA Symposium held in May, in London, UK |
Jeff Chapman1, Stephen Croft2
1Oak Ridge Associated Universities
Oak Ridge, TN USA
2
E-mail: chapmanj@orau.gov, scroft@canberra.com
ABSTRACT
Spontaneous fission 252Cf neutron sources are commonly used to calibrate
and test the operating performance of safeguards instruments and portal monitors.
252Cf is preferred over (á,n) sources for many operational and safety
reasons, but most importantly can be designed to emit an energy-dependent spectrum
that closely matches that of 240Pu. 240Pu is the pre-dominant neutron emitter
of plutonium metal and oxides. Because portal monitors and other border monitoring
devices are designed to detect low neutron fluence rates at distances of 1-3
metres from the detector, several characteristics in the manufacture and decay
of the source need to be understood and accounted for in order to make an accurate
measurement of the performance: isotopic composition and 250Cf to 252Cf evolution,
age, traceability, angular dependence of the neutron flux, and design and manufacture
of the moderating cover are examples. This paper describes these issues and
presents the range of possible error terms in the utilization of these physically
small, relatively weak, (10 4 n.s -1) neutron sources for calibration of portal
monitors.
INTRODUCTION
For calibration of neutron coincidence counters and multiplicity counters,
252Cf is used as a surrogate for 240Pu, the principle isotope of interest in
either low or high burnup plutonium fuels. In 1993 Croft [1] presented the
results of Harwell Laboratory’s work with 252Cf as a calibration source
for passive neutron counters. His work presents a comprehensive review of the
issues and effects observed, in time, with the neutron multiplicity distribution,
mean neutron energy, the Reals to Totals ratio, and the overall effect of source
isotopic composition, particularly as it influences the neutron output over
time. In passive neutron counters it is imperative to understand and account
for these effects so that an accurate representation of the counter’s
performance relative to a mixture of spontaneously fissioning isotopes found
in safeguarded and waste materials of plutonium ( 238Pu/ 240Pu/ 242Pu).
In the
last few years, a significant effort is underway for a large-scale development
and deployment of homeland defense and border monitoring equipment. Two types
of neutron detection systems have been deployed: large, fixed-geometry portal
monitors and hand-held radioisotope identifiers (RIDs). Most of these systems
use moderated 3He proportional counters to detect fission neutrons. Various
algorithms are used to analyze the signal neutron pulse train and alarm when
the rate is determined to be greater than the background rate. 252Cf sources
are used to calibrate the systems for efficiency and to test overall system
performance. Performance-based testing and calibration with 252Cf provides
assurances to the instrument users that IAEA Significant Quantities (SQs)1 can
be effectively detected and interdicted, as necessary.
This paper discusses the calibration issues of 252Cf relative to the performance
testing of these devices for international safeguards and interdiction, and
presents an additional framework to the original efforts of McGarry and Boswell.
[2]