Presented at the 46th Annual meeting of the INMM, Phoenix, AZ, July 10-14, 2005 |
B. Rollen
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nuclear Science and Technology - Safeguards
MS-6050, 1 Bethel Valley Road, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6050 USA
rollenhyjr@ornl.gov
G. Bosler, J. Tanaka
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Wagramer Strasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria
g.bosler@iaea.org, j.takaka@iaea.org
B. Gillespie
Canberra Industries
2425 Stevens Center Place, Richland, Washington 99352 USA
bgillespie@canberra.com
L. Hordijk
Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa
Technical Support: Nuclear Operations
Building P2400, NECSA, Pelindaba, Pretoria, South Africa
lhkad@necsa.co.za
R. L. Mayer
United States Enrichment Corporation
Applied Nuclear Technology, 3930 U.S. Rt. 23 S, Piketon, Ohio 45661 USA
mayerrl@ports.usec.com
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Department of Energy Office of International Safeguards and the Nuclear
Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) are collaborating on a measurement
campaign to complete an inventory of nuclear materials contained in waste drums
at Pelindaba. Containers with reportable quantities are declared to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). All known containers of high-enriched-uranium
waste have been measured and declared. However, some 20,000 drums containing
low-enriched- uranium (LEU) waste are currently being evaluated by the IQ3
drum waste assay scanner. The LEU inventory includes a large quantity of material
that is composed of a high-density waste matrix that contains high concentrations
of uranium. In some cases, the density or uranium quantity contained in the
waste drums exceeds the current measurement calibration limits. Calibration
of the IQ3 for these high-density, high-uranium-concentration containers
is complicated by the fact that suitable standards are not available. Because
this instrument is a dual-use system (i.e., both NECSA and IAEA personnel
perform measurements using the IQ3), the calibration standards and techniques
must be acceptable to both organizations. This paper provides an overview of
the project, including techniques devised to compensate for the lack of suitable
standards, as well as reconfiguration of the IQ3 to facilitate measurement
of high-density, high-uranium- concentration drums to ensure that an accurate
declaration of the LEU inventory can be completed.
INTRODUCTION
In 2001 the USDOE Office of International Safeguards (OIS) provided a nondestructive
assay (NDA) system to the NECSA under a bilateral agreement between the United
States and South Africa. The purpose of the system was to provide assay capability
to help to resolve an anomaly in the safeguards inventory that had been declared
to the IAEA and to characterize the legacy waste that had been generated by
a uranium enrichment program 1.
The system was delivered to the PelStore facility at the Pelindaba Nuclear
Institute, the location of the former uranium enrichment program. As a part
of the bilateral agreement, OIS provided a comprehensive support program, which
included an upgrade to the system (originally built in 1995). Oak Ridge National
Laboratory and Canberra Industries provided installation, setup, calibration,
training, and development of measurement techniques. The system was an IQ3
drum waste assay system manufactured by Canberra Industries. The IQ3 has the
capability of assaying 208-L drums using a six high-purity germanium (HP6e)
detector configuration. The three planar detectors in a vertical plane on the
rear are used for enrichment analysis, and the remaining three coaxial detectors
in a vertical plane on the right-hand side of the counting chamber are used
for quantification, with the capability of performing 133Ba transmission‑corrected
assays. The IQ3 drum-handling fixture was adapted to handle a variety of drum
sizes and diameters encountered at PelStore 2.
Prior work has involved developing calibrations and measurement techniques
for a large number of container sizes, waste matrices ranging from very low
density (< 0.1 g/cm 3) up to moderate densities (about 0.6 g/cm 3). Enrichments
range from depleted to 93% enriched uranium, and mass loadings rang from less
than 1 g of uranium up to more than kilogram quantities of uranium. The current
measurement campaign focuses on high‑density, LEU containers. These containers
have densities that can exceed 1.1 g/cm 3, with enrichment between depleted
and <20%, and may contain kilogram quantities of uranium.
Because this is a safeguards application, the primary criterion of interest
is 235U mass. In addition, the system is intended to be a shared‑use
system between NECSA and the IAEA. Each organization has configured its own
computer to control the IQ3 and has collaborated with U.S. experts to develop
calibration and measurement methods that are acceptable to both organizations
3.